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TRIAL BY JURY: RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE?
David P. Rowe, LL.B., J.D.*
If asked whether a person charged with using a firearm to
commit robbery had a right to a trial by a jury of his peers under
the Jamaican Constitution, jurists trained in the common law
jurisprudence of the English-speaking world would instinctively
answer that they would be unable to conceive of circumstances
under which it could not be accomplished. This article explores
whether a judge of the Supreme Court of Jamaica, sitting in the
capacity of a judge in the Jamaican Gun Court,
made bad law in
1
Queen.
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There was a time in Jamaican history when only members of
security forces were permitted to possess firearms. However, a
great number of Jamaicans came to illegally possess firearms, and
thereby transformed the otherwise tranquil island nation into an
island that was disrupted by an alarming use of firearms in the
commission of criminal offenses. As a result, the Firearms Act
was passed on March 16, 1967, and allowed only a privileged
group of citizens to keep and carry firearms, and a slightly larger
group of citizens to keep firearms in their homes. The Firearms
Act prescribed stringent conditions for the granting of any type of
2
firearm license to private citizens.
In May 1967, Prime Minister Hugh Shearer, speaking before
the Annual Conference of the Police Federation, stated that in the
interest of the country's reputation abroad, he could not reveal
*
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Trevor Stone v. the Queen, 3 All E.R. 148 (P.C. 1980).

Pursuant to § 29 (4) of the Firearms Act, a permit to carry a firearm "shall
be granted by the appropriate authority only if he is satisfied that the applicant
has a good reason for importing, purchasing, acquiring, or having in his
possession the firearm or ammunition in respect of which the application is
2

made."
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crime statistics because the statistics would be misconstrued.
Furthermore, he stated that when it came to handling crime, he did
not expect that "when he tackles a criminal, [he would have] to
recite any Beatitudes to him [the criminal]." 3 The number of
casualties caused by firearms in 1960 was nineteen, and quickly
4
escalated to over two hundred by 1967.
Following a strong public outcry after the March 1974
murder of businessman Leo Henry, Prime Minister Michael
Manley called for a "radical surgery for a grave disease,"5 and
'6
stated that in Jamaica's society there were "no places for guns."
The legislature, determined to suppress all armed criminals and to
preserve Jamaica's tourism industry based on its reputation as a
"tropical paradise," enacted the Gun Court Act on April 1, 1974.
This Act produced two of the most controversial cases in the
English-speaking Caribbean:
the Stone decision and the Hinds v.
7
decision.
The Queen
Through the Gun Court Act, the Jamaican Parliament
established a new court and bestowed upon it the power to handle
all firearms-related crimes. The Gun Court was originally divided
into three parts: (1) the Resident Magistrate, presided over by one
Resident Magistrate; (2) the Full Court, presided over by a panel of
three Resident Magistrates; and (3) the Circuit Court, presided over
by a judge of the Supreme Court who sat without a jury. The Gun
Court Act prescribed a special punishment regime (such as
indefinite detention) for an offense as minor as the possession of a
bullet. Portions of this special regime were found by the Privy
Council to be unconstitutional.

See TERRY LACEY, VIOLENCE AND POLITICS IN JAMAICA, 1960-70:
INTERNAL SECURITY IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY, at 138 (Manchester
University Press 1977) [hereinafter Lacey].
3

4

Id. at70.

5

Stalag in Kingston, TIME, Sept 23, 1974 at 55.

6

David B. Kopel, Symposium: Violence, Crime andPunishment, 12 St.

Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 285, 354.
7

Hinds v. the Queen, 1 All E.R. 353 (P.C. 1976).
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Hinds arose from a conviction in the lower Resident
Magistrate's Division. The judge convicted the appellant and his
co-appellants of possession of a firearm without a license, and
sentenced each offender to be detained for an indefinite period,
which would be determined by the Governor General. Two
separate panels of the Court of Appeals, as well as the Privy
Council, strongly addressed the issue of the Full Court's
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction was challenged by the appellants,
and gained the support of the Jamaican Bar Association and the
Jamaican Council for Human Rights on the ground that Parliament
had acted ultra vires of its power under Section 48(1) of the
Jamaican Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the
Parliament cannot consistently, within the separation of powers,
transfer the power to determine the severity of the punishment to
be inflicted on a person or a particular class of persons from the
8
judiciary to any executive body.
Prior to Jamaica's achieving its independence in 1962, no
constitutional difficulty would have arisen concerning the
Jamaican Parliament's power. At that time, higher law had not yet
The Independence
trammeled the Parliament's supremacy.
Constitution of 1962 introduced to Jamaican law a Westminster
model of law that clearly departed from the British tradition,
specifically, a written constitution. 9 For the first time in Jamaica's
history, a power higher than Parliament existed. The Jamaican
Constitution also featured novel provisions that, by empowering
Parliament to alter or amend the document through special
procedures in Sections 49 and 50, endeavored to strike a balance
between the supremacy of Parliament implied in the customary
institutions of Britain and the Judiciary's supremacy implied in the
United States Constitution.
In enacting the Gun Court Act, the Jamaican Parliament did
not follow the special procedures of either Section 49 or Section 50
of the Jamaican Constitution. Section 49 defines certain parts of
the Jamaican Constitution as being either "entrenched" or "deeply
entrenched." This section also forbids the Jamaican Parliament
from passing a statute that would amend an entrenched provision
8

Id. at 365.

9

See Lacey, supranote 3, at 45.
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unless the Parliament adopted the procedure prescribed by the
Jamaican Constitution. A bill to amend any of these provisions
must be placed on the table of the House of Parliament three
months before debate, and cannot be submitted to the Governor
General for assent until three months after the passage of the bill
by both Houses. In addition, a bill to amend the "deeply
entrenched" provisions of the constitution must be submitted to the
electorate between two and six months following passage by both
Houses, and must receive a majority of the electoral vote. For both
the "entrenched" and the "deeply entrenched" clauses, the
amending bill must be passed by a two-thirds vote of all members
of each House. However, there is no requirement for a referendum
from the electorate in the case of an amendment to the
"entrenched" clauses.
The Supreme Court of Jamaica was established pursuant to
Chapter VII, Part 1, of the Independence Constitution of 1962. It
is a court of first instance that possesses unlimited jurisdiction in
both civil and criminal matters. In addition, the Court has
supervisory jurisdiction over all of the Island's inferior courts and
tribunals, as spelled out in the Judicature (Supreme Court) Act of
Jamaica, which dates back to August 5, 1962. The Court of
Appeals was established under Part Two of the Constitution, and
has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Supreme Court and the
inferior courts and tribunals within the Island. The Court of
Appeals' jurisdiction and powers are prescribed in the Judicature
(Appellate Jurisdiction) Act of August 5, 1962. As established by
the Act, the Full Court was to be presided over by a panel of three
Resident Magistrates without the benefit of a jury or assessors.
The Resident Magistrates were responsible for trying all offenses
committed with a firearm, other than murder. However, given the
crime rates at that time, the Full Court would have been
empowered, pursuant to Sections 6 and 8, to try the vast majority
of serious cases on the Island. As Lord Diplock described:
[a] Full Court. . . is of [a] different composition
from any previously existing court in Jamaica. Its
jurisdiction too is different from that of any
previously existing court. It does not extend to any
capital offence [sic], but with this exception it
extends to all 'firearm offenses' . . . and its

1999-2000

119

Trial By Jury

sentencing powers for such offenses
extensive with those of a circuit court. I 0

are co-

Section 97(1) of the Independence Constitution, an entrenched
provision, established a Supreme Court that "shall have such
jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred upon it or by any
other law."'" In the course of his judgment in Hinds, Diplock
stated that "[t]o seek to apply to constitutional instruments the
canons of construction applicable to ordinary legislation in the
fields of substantive criminal or civil law would . . . be
misleading."' 12 Lord Diplock went on to hold that:
implicit in the very structure of a constitution on the
Westminster model is that judicial power, however
it be distributed from time to time between various
courts, is to continue to be vested in persons
appointed to hold judicial office in the manner and
on the terms laid down in the chapter dealing with
the judicature, even though this is not expressly
13
stated in the constitution.
As a result, the Privy Council struck down the Full Court, as
originally established under the Gun Act of 1974, on the grounds
that Resident Magistrates were not given the same level of
constitutional independence as the judges of the Supreme Court.
Counsel for the appellants, however, neglected to raise any
objections to the Full Court's constitutionality on the additional
grounds that the Resident Magistrates were to sit without a jury
when trying these cases.
The Jamaican Parliament was given an opportunity to amend
the Gun Court Act, and did so in Act 1 of 1976. Parliament
replaced the Full Court's three Resident Magistrates with a
10

See Hinds, supranote 7, at 363.

11

4 AMos J. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 806, 860. (rev. 3d ed.

1970) (1965).
12

See Hinds, supra note 7, at 360.

13

1d,
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member of the Supreme Court, which still sat without a jury. In
1976, Trevor Stone was tried and convicted for robbery with a
firearm by a Supreme Court judge, who was sitting without a jury.
Stone appealed to the Jamaican Court of Appeals, contending that
the right to a trial by jury, when charged with a grave crime, was
an entrenched provision of the Constitution, and could only be
altered under the special procedures prescribed in Section 49.
Moreover, although trial by jury was not specifically mentioned in
the Constitution as an entrenched provision, Section 97(1) provides
that the Constitution and other laws would define the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction.
Section 13(1) of the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council
of 1962 provided that the then-existing Supreme Court should be
the Supreme Court for purposes of the Constitution. Because the
Jamaican Supreme Court was also trying grave crimes with the use
of juries at that time, that right subsequently became part of the
jurisdiction and powers of the post-Independence Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeals, however, responded by asserting that a trial
without ajury was constitutional, and gave Stone leave to appeal to
the Privy Council. The Privy Council ruled that a trial "without a
jury under the 1974 Act or the 1976 amendment was a matter of
practice and procedure rather than a matter of the 'jurisdiction and
powers'... [and] did not, therefore, entrench trial by jury in such
14
cases or render the [Act] unconstitutional.'
Chapter III of the Jamaican Constitution contains a group of
sections known collectively as the "Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms" of the people. These sections may only be changed by
procedures prescribed in Sections 49 and 50. Section 20, one of
the entrenched provisions, provides that "[w]henever any person is
charged with a criminal offense he shall, unless the charge is
withdrawn, be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time, by
an independent and impartial court established by law."' 15 Even
though no specific language of trial by jury is present, Section 20
nonetheless sets out a right for a defendant to call witnesses, be
represented by counsel, receive a fair hearing, attend a public trial,
be presumed innocent, cross-examine witnesses, testify on his own
behalf, not be subject to retroactive criminal legislation, and be
14

See Stone, supra note 1, at 148.

15

See Peasleesupra note 11, at 817.
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free from double jeopardy and public emergency situations. This
apparent omission has inspired arguments that trial by jury,
although a part of the common law of the land, was not an
entrenched right. However, there seems to be absolutely nothing
in the language of Section 20 to suggest that the framers of the
Jamaican Constitution did not intend to preserve all of the common
law safeguards of criminal procedure.
For example, the right of the accused, under Section 20(6)(d),
to testify on his own behalf is a right that the accused had not
obtained in Jamaica in 1898, the year in which the Criminal
Evidence Act was passed in England. It is inconceivable that the
framers would enumerate minor and quite recent rights in Section
20 while excluding the ancient and most revered right of trial by
jury. As the decisions show, the Court applied the ordinary rule of
statutory construction, the very thing Lord Diplock cautioned
against in Hinds. It remains a massive contradiction in the
constitutional law of Jamaica that the rule of constitutional
construction avoided in Hinds was unceremoniously pressed into
service in the later case of Stone.
In 1681, the first Supreme Court of Jamaica exercised the
ordinary jurisdiction of a Court of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol
Delivery, a practice carried out by the Court of King's Bench in
Westminster. This practice continued until 1976, and was valiantly
defended by the Bar of Jamaica in Stone. For nearly three hundred
years, no judge of the Supreme Court of Jamaica had presided over
a criminal trial without the assistance of a jury in pondering the
facts of a case and issuing a verdict. However, pursuant to the Gun
Court Act, as amended in 1976, only a judge was called upon to
render a verdict. The Gun Court was a primary tool utilized by the
Jamaican government to contain a crime wave that threatened to
devastate the good name of the Island. One is left to wonder if the
perceived necessity for such drastic measures against firearmrelated crimes stampeded the courts to encroach upon certain key
constitutional protections. Hard cases do indeed make bad law.

